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Abstract
Despite a renaissance of policy design thinking in public policy literature and a renewed 
interest in agency in the policy process literature, agency in the policy design process has, 
so far, not received systematic attention. Understanding the agency at play when designing 
policy, however, is crucial for better comprehension of policy design choices and varia-
tion in policy design across cases. Here, we build on the hierarchical structure of design 
elements that constitute each policy and analyse how actors position themselves during a 
policy design process in relation to individual design elements. Our aim is to establish dif-
ferent actors’ roles in shaping the policy output in an inductive, single-case study using the 
empirical case of the Swiss renewable energy feed-in tariff. Notably, we find agency in the 
form of coalitions which emerge around particular design elements. Based on our repre-
sentative analysis, we derive the generalisable concept of design coalitions that we define 
as relational structures of actors who gather around and advocate for specific policy design 
elements during the policy design process. Policy design coalitions are dynamic through-
out the design process and strategic and constitute the determinants in translating policy 
problems into final policy designs during policy designing. Our approach allows us to shed 
light on the role of agency in the policy design process in general.
Keywords Policy design · Agency · Design elements · Sequencing · Actor coalitions · 
Energy policy
Introduction
In recent years, policy design has experienced a renaissance in public policy literature 
(Considine et al. 2014; Howlett 2014; Howlett and Lejano 2012). While theory building 
for the policy design process started as early as the 1980s (Howlett 2014), scholarly interest 
subsequently shifted away from questions of ‘designing’ towards questions of governance 
and globalisation (Howlett and Lejano 2012). Lately, however, policy design literature has 
regained momentum, with many articles referring to and further developing works from 
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the early phase of policy design theory (Considine 2012; Gormley 2007; Howlett 2014; 
Howlett and Cashore 2009; Howlett and Lejano 2012).
Cashore and Howlett (2007) have done important work in this regard with their tax-
onomy of nested policy design elements, which offers a useful tool for disaggregating the 
different elements of a policy (Howlett and Cashore 2009). Their matrix combines Hall’s 
(1993) three levels of policy change with two policy dimensions: policy aims and means. 
It thus provides a basis to qualitatively and quantitatively assess policy change of specific 
elements at different levels and helps to overcome the ‘dependent variable problem’ in pol-
icy change lamented by many scholars (e.g. Dupuis and Biesbroek 2013; Green-Pedersen 
2004; Kühner 2007; Schaffrin et al. 2015).
Several studies have used Cashore and Howlett’s taxonomy, or parts of it, to empirically 
analyse policy design and policy change across various geographies and policy fields, such 
as emergency management policy, transportation policy, climate change policy, clean air 
regulation and forest policy (e.g. Bache et al. 2015; Henstra 2011; Knill et al. 2012; Mak-
konen et al. 2015; Schaffrin et al. 2014, 2015). Yet, the majority of these studies examine 
the influence of policy design on policy outcome and thus lack an analysis of how policy 
designs emerge and, in particular, the role of actors therein.
This research gap is also prevalent in the broader design literature, where concepts of 
actors in the design process are limited in both extent and scope. The design literature defines 
‘policy designers’ as rational and omniscient government officials and their advisory sys-
tem (Craft and Howlett 2012; Craft and Wilder 2017; Howlett 2011; Howlett and Wellstead 
2011) and remains vague about the political actors and coalitions who are often involved 
in designing and deciding upon the final policy output. Conversely, policy process literature 
offers a wide-ranging arsenal of actor conceptualisations such as epistemic communities, 
discursive agents, and instrument constituencies (Leipold and Winkel 2017; Mukherjee and 
Howlett 2015; Voß and Simons 2014; Zito 2018). On a broader level, the advocacy coalition 
framework (ACF) offers a systematic approach for analysing the formation and maintenance 
of coalitions advocating for (or against) policy change (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014; Sabatier 
1988; Weible et al. 2009). These conceptualisations are helpful for understanding the role of 
actors in the processes behind policymaking, but are not systematically concerned with the 
output of policymaking processes, namely concrete policy design: Conceptually and empiri-
cally, these approaches are generally more interested in policy change per se or focus on indi-
vidual design elements, thus failing to look at policy design comprehensively.
In line with Howlett (2014, 190), who deems it ‘necessary to advance our understanding 
of both designs themselves and the processes which lead to their adoption, implementa-
tion, evaluation and reform’, we aim at addressing this research gap—i.e. the lack of actor 
conceptualisations in policy design—by analysing the role of actors in a specific policy 
design process. We argue that it is important to know how the political design actors posi-
tion themselves during the policy design process in relation to individual design elements 
and how they collectively shape the policy design output. Regarding policy design, we 
base our analysis on Cashore and Howlett’s taxonomy of nested policy design elements 
(Cashore and Howlett 2007; Howlett and Cashore 2009). More specifically, we study how 
design elements are formulated with respect to the actors and their preferences regarding 
design elements across different levels of abstraction. To do so, we use the empirical case 
of the Swiss renewable energy feed-in tariff (RE-FiT), which was implemented in 2009 
and which introduced the first comprehensive support scheme for renewable energy (RE) 
technologies in Switzerland. Our analysis shows that actors form coalitions around specific 
design elements, which are not stable throughout the design process but, instead, realign 
in the course of decisions regarding different design elements. Based on these findings, 
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we introduce the concept of design coalitions, which we define as relational structures of 
actors who gather around and advocate for specific policy design elements. These coali-
tions have two main characteristics; they are dynamic and strategic. Thus, we propose a 
new, mid-range concept that links actors and policy design and thereby contribute to the 
understanding of how political design actors shape the policy design output.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The “Policy design and actor con-
ceptualisations” section  provides the theoretical foundation reviewing the policy design 
literature (“Policy design” section) and actor conceptualisations in the design (“Actors in 
policy designing” section) and the policy process literature (“Actor conceptualisations in 
the policy process literature” section).  The  “Research design and research case” section 
gives an overview of the research case and the methods for addressing the research ques-
tion. The “Results” section describes our empirical results regarding the policy design and 
the policymaking process (“Design elements and design process” section) and the role of 
actors at different design levels (“Actors at different levels of the design process” section). 
The “Discussion” section discusses these results and introduces the notion of design coali-
tions, while the “Conclusion” section concludes the paper.
Policy design and actor conceptualisations
This paper aims at integrating the role of actors into policy design literature. In the fol-
lowing, we will present policy design and actors in more detail: In the  “Policy design” 
section, we review policy design literature and offer an overview on recent progress in ana-
lysing specific policy design elements and how they together constitute a ‘policy design’. 
In the subsequent two sections, we shift to the design process itself, with a particular 
focus on actors. In the “Actors in policy designing” section, we do so by looking at how 
policy design literature conceptualises the actors involved in policy designing. Finally, in 
the “Actor conceptualisations in the policy process literature” section, we broaden the per-
spective by reviewing actor conceptualisations within the policy process literature to find 
whether they are suitable for design-related questions.
Policy design
The literature conceptualises policy design as both a noun and a verb—i.e. policy design 
and policy designing (Howlett 2014; Schneider and Ingram 1988). Traditional design liter-
ature has typically focused on the noun, referring to the content of a policy output with dif-
ferent design elements. An increasing number of studies has analysed and classified these 
elements of public policies (Howlett 2009, 2014; Schneider and Ingram 1988). Recently, 
the attention of public policy scholars has broadened to also encompass policy design as a 
verb, describing the process of formulating the policy output. In this section, we will focus 
on the noun to conceptualise what is negotiated when designing policy, before considering 
the actors involved in the next sections.
In the past, policy design literature has shifted its focus several times from policy instru-
ment choice to policy mixes to policy design choice. In the 1980s, a large body of litera-
ture emerged analysing policy design (Howlett 2014; Howlett and Lejano 2012) with the 
main attention on specific policy instrument choices (e.g. Bowers 2005; Goulder and Parry 
2008; Gunningham and Sinclair 2005; Hepburn 2006; Howlett and Ramesh 1993; Jordan 
et al. 2003; Keohane et al. 1998; Rist 1998; Stavins 1996), since policy instruments were 
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understood as constituting the actual tools through which policy goals are achieved (Howl-
ett and Lejano 2012; Linder and Peters 1988, 1991; May 2003). Later, the attention of 
design scholars moved to instrument mixes, their effectiveness, and how their instruments 
interact (e.g. Flanagan et  al. 2011; Howlett and Rayner 2007; del Río González 2014; 
Schmidt and Sewerin 2018). However, recently, design scholars have also started to isolate 
the basic elements of each policy’s design (e.g. Cashore and Howlett 2007; Howlett 2014; 
Howlett and Cashore 2009; Schaffrin et al. 2015), thus creating a reference point for more 
fine-grained analyses of the specifics of particular instruments (Haelg et al. 2018).
Based on Hall (1993), Cashore and Howlett (2007) have developed a hierarchy of policy 
design elements to help identify the building blocks of a policy. They propose breaking 
down policies into three levels of abstraction and two ‘policy foci’, i.e. the policy require-
ments or aims and the policy means (see also Fig. 1). Policy aims represent what the pol-
icy intends to achieve. Conversely, policy means define how to achieve these aims. These 
policy foci are embedded across different abstraction levels, with policy choices and pref-
erences at higher levels informing and determining policy design at lower levels. Policy 
instrument choices are, for instance, restricted to a limited set of options given the abstract, 
high-level preferences for instrument logic. The same applies to the calibrations of the 
instrument, which are largely dependent on the type of instrument chosen. Similarly, pol-
icy aims co-determine each other—from abstract high-level goals to mid-level objectives 
to specific low-level settings. Using the example of British macroeconomic policy, Hall 
(1993, 284) describes the influence of higher-level policy elements on lower-level elements 
as follows, ‘[w]hen monetarism replaced Keynesianism as the template guiding policy, 
there was a radical shift in the hierarchy of goals guiding policy, the instruments relied on 
to effect policy, and the settings of those instruments’.
In ideal-type scenarios, nascent policy fields emerge with defining and negotiating the 
general policy problem and ideas for addressing it. Subsequently, the process moves towards 
the concrete questions of policy objectives and instrument types before settings and calibra-
tions are defined. Once a policy subsystem is established, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to alter higher-level aims and means, and incremental design changes at the lower levels 
prevail, replacing or adding specific elements of the pre-established policy mix (Breunig 
and Koski 2012; Howlett and Migone 2011; Kern and Howlett 2009; Weiss and Woodhouse 
1992). To illustrate the pattern of higher-level elements not only determining lower-level 
elements, but also occurring earlier in the design process, we illustrate Cashore and Howl-
ett’s (2007) matrix as a hierarchy narrowing from top to bottom (Fig. 1). In the following, we 
will dive deeper into the different levels of abstraction, starting at the top of the hierarchy.
Fig. 1  Hierarchy of policy design elements. Adapted from Cashore and Howlett (2007), Howlett and 
Cashore (2009) and Howlett (2009)
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The highest level of abstraction corresponds to the general types of ideas behind a policy 
and the general norms that guide agents’ implementation preferences (Cashore and Howlett 
2007; Howlett and Cashore 2009; Kern and Howlett 2009). Here, the issue that a policy 
should address is decided upon (i.e. the general policy goals), and the toolbox available to 
policymakers for achieving the goal is defined (i.e. the general policy instrument logics). 
These goals and instrument logics correspond to stable, long-term governance modes span-
ning across sectors, which are largely determined by the prevalent political actors and insti-
tutional settings and, in turn, largely determine how policy is designed at the lower, more 
specific levels (Howlett 2009). Examples for general policy goals and general instrument 
logics include climate change mitigation and a preference for non-coerciveness, respectively.
The policy aims and means of the mid-level abstraction are represented by the policy 
objectives and the policy instrument type. These choices are confined by boundaries set at 
the macro-level. An example of a policy objective for climate change mitigation is a green-
house gas reduction target, and an example of a non-coercive policy instrument type is a 
cap-and-trade system. As mentioned earlier, a large body of literature has analysed policy 
instrument choices due to their importance in determining how policy goals are achieved 
(Howlett 2014; Linder and Peters 1988). However, solely focusing on instrument types 
leaves the important question of design choices unanswered and omits the embedding of 
the instrument in a cluster of design elements.
The lowest level of abstraction includes specific policy settings and instrument calibra-
tions and represents the formulation and implementation of higher-level aims and means. 
An example of a specific policy setting for a greenhouse gas reduction target is a specific 
value, such as the EU’s targeted 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 from the 
1990 levels. An example of a specific instrument calibration for a cap-and-trade system 
is the number of freely issued emission certificates. Innovation studies have shown that 
design decisions at this abstraction level have substantial influence on policy outcome 
(Ashford et al. 1985; Jenner et al. 2013; Kemp and Pontoglio 2011; Schmidt and Sewerin 
2018).
Cashore and Howlett’s taxonomy is a useful tool for breaking up a policy into its design 
elements. To understand where these policy design elements originate from, we will, in the 
following, look at the process of policy designing and the role of actors therein.
Actors in policy designing
Policy design studies have, in recent years, moved their focus to include policy design-
ing—i.e. the process of formulating the policy output and the protagonists driving the 
process. Here, policy designers make ‘conscious, intentional, and deliberate choices’ to 
implement the most effective and efficient policy design (Howlett 2014, 198). Thus far, 
however, policy designing literature focuses on the design process within administrations 
with the advice of external political and technical experts (Craft and Wilder 2017; Howl-
ett and Wellstead 2011). Howlett and Mukherjee (2014, 58) posit policy designing to be 
‘driven by knowledge and evidence of alternatives’ merits and demerits in achieving policy 
goals rather than by other processes such as bargaining or electioneering among key policy 
actors’. In this literature, policy designing is thus dissociated from the messy political arena 
and involves rational and knowledgeable actors with ‘a great deal of administrative and 
analytical capacity’ (Howlett 2014, 195).
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The perspective of policy designers as omniscient and omnipotent government officials 
and their advisors is challenged by empirics showing that the adopted policy design may 
not necessarily be the most effective and efficient path to address a policy goal (Béland 
2007; Hacker 2004; Kern and Howlett 2009). In reality, policies may have to undergo 
several cycles of (re-)designing instead of being directly decided upon by civil servants. 
Even though rational actors may sketch a rational policy in the first draft, political forces at 
play in the subsequent political (and politicised) design process may lead to a considerably 
altered policy design being adopted in the end (Wilder 2017). In contrast to the conceptu-
alisation of rational policy designers, the actors present in this political design phase may 
be driven by factors other than effectiveness and cost efficiency. Thus, it can be argued 
that policy design may not solely be introduced by a set of rational policy designers, but 
rather through interaction between various actors who move in the confinement of the pre-
sent institutions and on the basis of different interests and resources (Bressers and O’Toole 
1998; Engeli and Varone 2011; May 2003; Voß et al. 2009) and who may make decisions 
in contingent and opportunistic ways (Howlett and Lejano 2012; Kingdon 1984). We argue 
that it is therefore important to know how political design actors position themselves dur-
ing the policy design process in relation to the individual design elements.
Actor conceptualisations in the policy process literature
In contrast to policy design literature, policy process literature offers a wide-ranging arse-
nal of actor conceptualisations, which aid understanding of messy policymaking processes. 
For instance, policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984) are actors interested in promoting 
significant change in a certain policy field; they are conceptualised as knowing how to 
influence agenda setting and to leverage windows of opportunities to translate their ideas 
into policy solutions (e.g. Mintrom and Norman 2009; Weible and Ingold 2018). Simi-
larly, epistemic communities describe groups of actors who are concerned with and gather 
around policy issues and problem definitions based on scientific knowledge (e.g. Haas 
1992; Zito 2018). Discourse coalitions or discursive agents are defined as a set of actors 
who share a perception of how to present and frame issues (e.g. Leipold and Winkel 2017; 
Steensland 2008). Conversely, instrument constituencies are conceptualised as groups of 
actors who gather around a specific instrument type, indifferent to the policy field (e.g. 
Béland and Howlett 2016; Simons and Voß 2017). All these approaches have in common 
that they analyse the actors present in specific instances of the policymaking process or 
only study one specific design element (Capano and Galanti 2018; Voß and Simons 2014). 
Additionally, these conceptualisations study only a subset of actors with specific functions 
in the policy process. Thus, they do not offer the breadth to trace the political design actors 
and their coordination with other actors through the policy design process and to explain 
final policy design output.
On a much higher level, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) may fill the gap out-
lined above with its consistent actor conceptualisation. The ACF is an important approach 
that has shaped the view of actors and agency in the policy process. It argues that vari-
ous actors aggregate in advocacy coalitions according to a shared set of normative and 
causal beliefs and cooperate to influence policymaking in their favour (Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014; Sabatier 1988). The ACF views policymaking as being the ultimate result of coali-
tion formation over long time periods (Knox-Hayes 2012; Sabatier 1988) and sees advo-
cacy coalitions as stable beyond singular policy decisions (Weible and Ingold 2018). The 
ACF’s belief system primarily serves as an explanatory basis for coalition formation and 
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maintenance, as well as for policy stability rather than illustrating the drivers of policy 
change (Cairney 2007; Capano 2009; Mintrom and Vergari 1996; Wilder 2017). Also, the 
ideal–typical ACF understanding that the beliefs of the strongest coalition directly translate 
into policy output may apply to long term, overarching policy development and across the 
different stages of a policy cycle (Weible et al. 2009). However, it does not seem to offer 
the fine-grained qualities necessary for dealing with an actual policy design process and 
its output. We thus identify a gap between the ACF, whose main attention lies on the long-
term patterns of policy stability and change, and the previously presented actor concepts, 
which focus on specific design elements of the policy process and a subset of actors. These 
conceptualisations thus collectively lack the explanatory power to analyse the role of actors 
in the design process of one individual policy and in shaping the final policy design output.
With the present study, we aim at integrating the role of actors into the policy design 
literature. We do so by applying Cashore and Howlett’s taxonomy to an empirical case and 
by analysing how actors influence decisions on individual policy design elements. Thus, 
we seek to understand how political design actors position themselves during the policy 
design process in relation to the individual design elements. Thereby, we aim at inductively 
developing a new, mid-range concept specifically linking actors and policy design.
Research design and research case
Our research design is inductive. Conducting a qualitative single-case study (Eisenhardt 
1989; Gerring 2004), we analyse which actors take part in and how they influence the out-
come of the legislative process of the Swiss renewable energy feed-in tariff (RE-FiT). In 
“Case selection” section, we introduce our case and the case selection strategy. In “Histori-
cal context” section, we outline the historical background of the empirical case. Finally in 
“Method and sampling” section, we summarise our data collection and sampling strategy.
Case selection
In the Swiss renewable energy (RE) policy mix, the RE-FiT represents the flagship policy. 
A feed-in tariff is a technology deployment policy, which offers renewable electricity pro-
ducers guaranteed electricity grid access and cost-covering reimbursement per unit of pro-
duced electricity with a long-term contract (Haelg et al. 2018; Jacobs 2014; Stokes 2013). 
Often, a feed-in tariff is financed by a consumer surcharge imposed on every unit of elec-
tricity consumed.
The Swiss policymaking process is highly formalised and structured (see a detailed 
overview of the Swiss policymaking process in Table 1). It includes the publication of a 
policy draft, together with a declaration and discussion of the aims and means the policy 
addresses. The process also involves a public consultation in which all stakeholders may 
express their opinions on the draft, preliminary negotiations about every policy element 
within the parliamentary committee and a subsequent debate in the plenum where every 
paragraph of the policy is discussed and voted upon. The draft shuttles between the two 
parliamentary chambers and their committees until every policy element is decided upon 
by a majority.
Our research case represents a deviant case suitable for theory building, when the out-
come is known but the factors contributing to the outcome are unknown (Beach and Ped-
ersen 2013; Seawright and Gerring 2008). Additionally, from a theoretical sampling point 
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of view and in line with Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), our case is particularly well-
suited, since it enables to trace the designing of an entirely new flagship policy in an unu-
sually transparent context. In the following, we will elaborate on these two aspects.
First, RE has only recently appeared as a policy subfield, gaining momentum in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, when the topics of climate change and peak oil arrived on the radar 
of the general public and policymakers. It therefore allows us to trace a relatively recent 
design process, which initially offered a high degree of freedom in terms of design choices 
and in which the three levels of abstraction were subject to debate and influenced by a mul-
titude of actors.
Second, Switzerland is an extreme case in terms of its structured and institutional-
ized policymaking process and its transparency allows for reconstructing the role of actors 
with respect to the various design elements. Data availability and accessibility is high. All 
debates—whether in the committee or plenum—have minutes taken, or are transcribed, and 
are made available to researchers. Additionally, the Swiss lay parliamentarians are not only 
representatives of their parties, but also of associations and interest groups and, therefore, 
must publicly disclose their commitments with such organisations. Thus, it is possible to link 
the statements of parliamentarians with corresponding associations and interest groups.1
We limit the scope of the RE-FiT analysis to the legislative phase of the policymaking 
process starting with the preparation of the project draft and spanning up to the end of 
the parliamentary phase (steps 4–18 in Table 1). In so doing, we exclude the first techni-
cal phase of drafting the proposal in the corresponding energy office2 and the subsequent 
government approval, as well as the second technical phase after the parliament’s decision, 
during which the energy office translated the specifications of the new RE-FiT from its law 
into the respective ordinance. We do this with the purpose of tracing the role of actors in 
the political design process during which the final policy output is decided.
Historical context
In Switzerland, the electricity sector is primarily governed at the national level (Sager 
2006). In 1991, parliament adopted its first, very limited RE policy, which guaranteed grid 
access for electricity from RE sources and offered a tariff dependent on the cost of conven-
tional electricity production irrespective of the technology and resource.3 Complementary 
instruments included voluntary agreements with the large utilities to increase RE genera-
tion, investment grants for solar photovoltaic (PV) installations and research and develop-
ment support.
Starting in 2004, RE policy was completely redesigned to deliver a first comprehen-
sive support for RE technologies: a flagship policy in the form of a cost-covering, technol-
ogy-specific feed-in tariff was adopted—the focus of this study.4 This happened in light of 
1 In the present case, the government, and federal ministries other than the energy office did not participate, 
or only marginally participated, in making the new RE-FiT, as indicated by the documents of the interde-
partmental consultation process. This adds to the transparency of the case since the role of other actors 
external to the government and administration was, thus, more important.
2 The energy office, officially called Swiss Federal Office of Energy, is the responsible authority for ques-
tions around energy supply and energy use at the national level and a subordinate agency of the Swiss Fed-
eral Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications.
3 Resolution on energy use (Energienutzungsbeschluss/Arrêté sur l’énergie), SR 730.0, AS 1991 1018.
4 The feed-in tariff was implemented in Art. 7, 7a, 7b, Law on energy (Energiegesetz vom 26. Juni 1998/
Loi du 26 juin 1998 sur l’énergie), SR 730.0, AS 2008 775.
Policy Sciences 
1 3
electricity market liberalisation, which Switzerland intended to introduce to comply with 
EU legislation.5 However, in 2002, parliament’s first attempt to liberalise the electricity 
market was rejected by Swiss voters in a referendum forced by labour unions with the sup-
port of left-wing and green groups. In a second attempt to at least partially liberalise the 
electricity market, an expert committee elaborated a compromise, which included (amongst 
others) the idea to completely redesign RE support to convince parliamentarians of the left 
to vote in favour of the liberalisation. The government published the corresponding draft in 
2004 after a public consultation process, and the feed-in tariff was accepted in a final vote 
by both chambers of parliament in February 2007, taking effect in 2009.6
Method and sampling
In this study, we proceeded in three steps. First, we conducted comprehensive desk 
research. We scanned draft and final versions of the Swiss Law on Energy to define the 
policy design elements debated in the legislative phase of the policy process. We also 
examined stakeholder statements submitted during the public consultation process to map 
relevant actors involved in the design phase, as well as their initial positions (see Table 4 
for a list of the included actors). Finally, we collected and analysed academic literature and 
public and technical reports to compile the theory and background sections of this paper.
Second, we analysed the protocols of the energy committee meetings7 and the transcripts 
of the parliamentary debates to trace the different actors’ positions through the process. Addi-
tionally, we conducted interviews with bureaucrats, parliamentarians and representatives of 
industry associations to gain insights on processes not publicly available. We interviewed 
a sample of 17 persons involved in the Swiss policymaking process, who were identified 
during desk research (listed in Table 2). The interviewees were contacted via e-mail. The 
interviews were conducted in person or by phone, lasted between 30 and 120 min and were 
recorded and subsequently transcribed. Two additional actors were not interviewed directly 
but gave a written statement on their positions in the process by e-mail.
Third, we coded the statements in the public consultation process, the protocols of the 
energy committee meetings, the transcripts of the parliamentary debates, and the transcripts 
of the interviews. We coded these alongside, and assigned them to, the various actors and 
the different policy design elements—both in the draft and produced throughout the par-
liamentary process (see Tables  3 and 4). Statements and votes by parliamentarians were 
assigned to the respective parties, as well as other actors, such as associations, based on their 
registries of interests for the specific year.8 The codes for the policy design elements were 
5 Even though Switzerland is not a member of the EU, it is heavily integrated in the European electric-
ity market. Thus, to keep access to the electricity markets of its neighbouring countries, it is necessary for 
Switzerland to comply with EU legislation.
6 In our study, we focus on how the design of the feed-in tariff came about and, more specifically, how and 
why these design elements were decided upon. The specific tariffs paid for electricity generation from the 
various RE technologies, as well as the conditions for receiving these tariffs, were formulated by the energy 
office and decided upon by the government and are, together with later amendments of the feed-in tariff, out 
of this study’s scope.
7 Note that, even though the protocols of the energy committee meetings are available for researchers, they 
are confidential. For this reason, it is prohibited to use quotes or name participants (or their party affilia-
tions) from the meetings. In the following, we thus use data from the committee meeting protocols only as 
aggregated results.
8 Smaller parties and parliamentarians without party affiliation are omitted from this study.
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defined in two ways: For the design elements at mid and low level of abstraction, we stud-
ied all draft versions of the policy and additional proposals by policymakers and assigned 
the codes accordingly. However, as the Swiss RE-FiT does not contain information on the 
high-level goals and instrument logics, we coded statements by the various actors in terms 
of what they aimed at achieving with the policy (general policy goals) and how they aimed 
at achieving it (general instrument logics). The codes are summarised in Table 3. This cod-
ing allowed us to link the actors with the design elements and, thus, to find out which actors 
favoured and supported which design elements. This procedure provided us with a solid 
overview of the actors’ positions and their coordination around specific design elements.
Results
The empirical section of this paper first delineates the specific design elements of the Swiss 
RE-FiT and the sequential process in which they were decided upon (“Design elements and 
design process” section). Second, it studies the actors and their preferences that drove these 
decisions by thoroughly analysing the three levels of abstraction and the debate around design 
alternatives at these individual levels, as well as how the actors positioned themselves around 
these elements (“Actors at different levels of the design process” section).
Design elements and design process
Figure 2 summarises the specific design elements of the Swiss RE-FiT using the hierarchy 
introduced in Fig. 1. At this point of the paper, we only consider the mid-level and low-
level design elements, because the high-level aims and means, which refer to the overarch-
ing goal a policy should address and the general instrument type (see “Policy design” sec-
tion), were not formally decided upon and were thus not written down in the Swiss RE-FiT. 
They, however, continuously influenced actors’ design element decisions at the lower lev-
els, which is why they will be extensively covered in the “High-level abstraction: general 
policy goals and general instrument logic” section.
The parliamentary process began in the first chamber of parliament with an ‘entry 
debate’, during which it was decided if the RE policy was going to be completely rede-
signed. In line with statements by the parliamentarians, we use this debate and its subse-
quent decision as a proxy for the decision about introducing a RE target.9 The first cham-
ber of parliament then moved to the specifics of the policy target—deciding, on the one 
hand, about the specific RE target value and, on the other hand, which new RE technolo-
gies to include in the scheme. Subsequently, the instrument type—the feed-in tariff—and 
a specific instrument calibration—the cap of the consumer surcharge, which serves to 
finance the policy instrument—were decided upon. The RE target and feed-in tariff were 
confirmed at once as the policy objective and instrument type by the second chamber of 
parliament and were not contested anymore in the subsequent debate. The main elements 
of discussion within the second chamber of parliament were the RE technologies to be 
included in the scheme, as well as the cap of the consumer surcharge. In addition to includ-
ing small hydropower in the catalogue of supported technologies, a requirement for new 
9 In Switzerland, the first and second chambers of parliament are called the National Council and the Coun-
cil of States, respectively.
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installations to be built at a suitable location was added to limit the number of wind instal-
lations and limit solar PV as well. This limitation on solar PV was the main point of disa-
greement between the two parliamentary chambers and was decided at the very last. The 
cap of the consumer surcharge was also a major point of disagreement within both par-
liamentary chambers until the very last, when the second chamber ultimately fixed it at a 
rather high value. Finally, a new instrument calibration element was added by the second 
parliamentary chamber, namely the substantial exemption of large electricity consumers 
from the surcharge. The contested policy design elements were finalised in two subsequent 
rounds through the parliamentary chambers. As summarised in Fig. 11, the design process 
followed the hierarchical structure proposed by Howlett and Cashore (2009).
Actors at different levels of the design process
In this section, we show how the various actors influence the choice of the different design 
elements presented in the previous section. We start by analysing the high-level abstrac-
tion design elements, i.e. the different actors’ general policy goals and instrument log-
ics (“High-level abstraction: general policy goals and general instrument logic” section). 
Crucially, these design elements influence the actors’ choices at the lower levels of the 
taxonomy. Subsequently, we present our results on the mid-level abstraction design ele-
ments (“Mid-level abstraction: policy objectives and policy instrument type” section) and 
low-level abstraction design elements (“Low-level abstraction: specific policy settings and 
specific instrument calibrations” section).
High‑level abstraction: general policy goals and general instrument logic
The results show that general policy goals and general instrument logics supported and 
put forward by various actors are manifold (Fig. 3). We have identified seven general pol-
icy goals of the different actors as summarised in Fig. 3a. Four abstract policy goals were 
Fig. 2  Policy design elements of the Swiss RE-FiT as implemented in 2009, represented by Cashore and 
Howlett’s taxonomy. Note that the general abstract policy goals and general policy instrument logic were 
not formally decided upon by the parliament and are thus not specified. Also note that we exclude policy 
design elements concerned with large hydropower from this study, as well as additional minor policy instru-
ments, such as security collaterals for geothermal plants and tradable certificates
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Fig. 3  Actors and a) their general abstract policy goals and b) their general policy instrument logics. The 
figures show the seven most important design elements (dark grey squares) stated by the actors (light grey 
circles) in the analysed data. The bars show which actors support which design elements, and their weight 
represents the relative importance of the respective design element for the actors, qualitatively determined 
by the actors’ statements in the analysed documents and interviews. See Table 3 for the specific cue state-
ments included in the different design elements
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supported by nearly all actors10: energy security and independence, low and long-term sta-
ble electricity prices, sustainable energy provision, and industrial competitiveness.11 How-
ever, the relative importance actors ascribed to these goals varied greatly.12 In addition, 
there are several goals assigned to only a few actors, including the decentralisation of elec-
tricity production, the mitigation of nuclear risk and a liberalised electricity market.13
Figure 3b summarises the general instrument logics put forward by the various actors. 
We observe that, here, the actors were more scattered than previously in their preferences 
for the general policy goals. Some actors, such as the Free-Market and Far-Right Parties, 
as well as the large and small utilities, highly valued market logic but assigned minor or 
no importance to policy effectiveness (i.e. substantial deployment of various RE technolo-
gies). Conversely, other actors, including the Green and Left Parties and RE associations, 
valued policy effectiveness much more than market logic. Cost minimisation was supported 
by most actors, though to varying degrees. The same applies to technology selection (i.e. 
that the policy should pick winners and, thus, the instrument should offer different levels of 
support to different technologies).14 Still other policy instrument logics preferred by some 
actors included non-coerciveness, the subsidiarity principle and technology neutrality.
Generally, we find that, because of the abstract nature of the design elements at this 
level, actors may have many different goals and instrument logics they intend to address at 
once, as they do not need to formally choose between different options. We also observe 
that while most actors agreed on the most relevant general policy goals, they not only disa-
greed on the importance they assigned to these goals but were also much more divided 
when concerning the instrument logic necessary to achieve these goals.
Mid‑level abstraction: policy objectives and policy instrument type
The design elements at mid-level abstraction were the focus of debates in the first chamber of 
parliament, while the second chamber of parliament subsequently confirmed the design ele-
ments at this level (see “Design elements and design process” section). The policy objective of 
increasing RE deployment and introducing an RE target was supported by a coalition incor-
porating the large majority of these actors, who saw RE technologies as a means to achieve 
their general policy goals (Fig. 4). Only some actors—i.e. parts of the Far-Right Party and the 
10 A list of the actor acronyms and the organisations they include is found in Table 4.
11 Note that, with roughly 60% large hydro and 40% nuclear, Switzerland’s electricity mix is historically 
largely  CO2 emissions-free. For this reason, climate change mitigation has not featured prominently in this 
debate.
12 For instance, sustainable energy provision was an important goal for the Green Party and, to a smaller 
extent, for actors such as environmental associations, cities and municipalities and RE associations. It was 
only of minor importance to other actors, such as the Centre Party and the Far-Right Party (who, in turn, 
highly valued industrial competitiveness) and large utilities for whom energy security was the major goal.
13 The latter stems from the fact that implementing the feed-in tariff was connected to the proposal of lib-
eralising the electricity market, against which various actors—including the Left and Green Parties, the 
labour unions, the farmers and the RE, environmental and consumer associations—threatened to force a 
public referendum in case comprehensive support for RE technologies was refused. Hence, actors in favour 
of a liberalised electricity market, such as the government, the Centre and Free-Market Parties and the large 
utilities, supported a RE policy to secure liberalisation.
14 In the case of technology selection, the interests of the different actors varied greatly. Some actors, such 
as the Far-Right Party, the large utilities and the cantons, favoured technology selection to specifically 
exclude some technologies from the scheme. Conversely, other actors favoured technology selection to give 
every technology the chance to be deployed and compete with other technologies.
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business associations, as well as the industry association and the majority of the cantons15—
were against an RE target since they deemed large hydropower and nuclear power, rather than 
RE technologies, suitable for achieving their general policy goals. However, with the support of 
the majority of the actors, the introduction of an RE target was relatively uncontested.
The choice of instrument type, however, could not be decided upon as unanimously as 
the policy objective. Driven by different opinions on the general instrument logics shown 
above, the actors had diverging opinions on the instrument type best suited to achieve an 
RE target. Three main instrument types were proposed, each supported by a distinct coali-
tion (Fig. 5). The first was voluntary quotas favoured by most of the Far-Right Party and 
business associations, as well as the government, the cantons, the industry association and 
the large utilities. This coalition included, on the one hand, actors who had previously 
opposed the introduction of an RE target, as well as those whose main preferences in terms 
of instrument logic were non-coerciveness and cost minimisation. The second instrument 
type was RE auctions, supported by most of the Centre Party and parts of the Free-Market 
Party, for which the preferred instrument logic consisted of market logic and cost minimi-
sation. The third instrument was an RE feed-in tariff favoured by a widespread coalition, 
Fig. 4  Actor coalitions around the policy objective—the RE target. The squares represent the design ele-
ments, and the connected circles represent the actors supporting the design elements. The victorious coali-
tion and its respective design elements are displayed in green, and the losing coalition and its respective 
design elements are displayed in yellow. (Color figure online)
15 The Swiss cantons are the subnational administrative divisions.
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Fig. 5  Actor coalitions around the policy instrument type. The squares represent the design elements, and 
the connected circles represent the actors supporting the design elements. The victorious coalition and its 
respective design element are displayed in green, while the losing coalition and its respective design ele-




including the Left and Green Parties, RE, environmental and consumer associations, cit-
ies and municipalities, farmers, and parts of the Centre, Free-Market and Far-Right Par-
ties. These actors’ preferred instrument logic was policy effectiveness—i.e. maximum RE 
deployment. Indeed, many of these actors argued that the feed-in tariff had been shown 
to induce the greatest outcome in terms of RE deployment in other countries and, hence, 
was the most effective instrument type. The energy office was relatively undecided on the 
matter.16
The coalition around voluntary quotas was the weakest and lost the first vote in the first 
parliamentary chamber, leading to most of its members subsequently joining the auctions coa-
lition. Auctions were considered to correspond to a market logic and minimise costs, and the 
actors who favoured those logics over policy effectiveness, such as the industry association 
and the large utilities, thus moved from voluntary quotas to auctions in line with these higher-
level preferences.17 In a further vote, the parliament opted for the feed-in tariff as opposed 
to auctions. Even though the Left and Green wings of parliament did not have a majority by 
far, the feed-in tariff coalition was complemented by many other actors, who, for instance, 
managed to split the other parties across coalitions. Parliamentarians of the Far-Right, Centre 
and Free-Market Parties, who were, besides others, representatives of farmers, businesses and 
French-speaking regions, also supported the feed-in tariff in line with their high-level goals.18 
Even though most of these actors would have preferred a cost-minimising and market-logic 
instrument, they supported the outcome-maximising feed-in tariff to effectively support the 
deployment of RE technologies and thus achieve their general policy goals.19 They thus opted 
to weigh their policy goals higher than their preferred instrument logic.
The actors in the outlined legislative process coordinated in many ways to increase 
the support for their preferred design elements. Very early on in the process, we find evi-
dence for coordination between actors with similar preferences. For instance, several dif-
ferent renewable energy associations referred to the statements of other associations in 
their own statements submitted during the public consultation process. Other examples of 
16 The former head of the energy office stated, “we were relatively open to introduce [an RE support instru-
ment], but it was completely unclear which one. Therefore, we just offered a selection [of instruments] for 
the parliament to decide” (Interviewee 5 in Table 2).
17 A Far-Right parliamentarian stated at the beginning of the debate, “[i]f against expectation, [the volun-
tary quotas] do not receive a majority, we will […] take the freedom to pivot to one of the other proposed 
instruments. Though I think that support of the more expensive [feed-in tariff] is out of the question for 
us”—Jürg Stahl, AB 2005 N 1091/BO 2005 N 1091.
18 Besides industrial competitiveness, farmers and some businesses were also particularly interested in 
decentralising electricity production, while the French-speaking areas, and thus their parliamentarians, are 
traditionally critical of nuclear power and saw RE technologies as a means to replace it. The traditional 
scepticism of the French-speaking areas against nuclear power has three origins. First, a French nuclear 
power plant, considered unsafe, is located near the Swiss border. Second, there were plans to build a per-
manent nuclear waste storage in the French-speaking canton of Vaud, which raised the opposition of its 
population against nuclear power in general. Third, no Swiss nuclear power plant is located in the French-
speaking areas and hence no jobs or income are dependent on it.
19 A Free-Market parliamentarian and representative of a business association stated during the debate, 
“[in] our targets, we agree as never before that the renewable energies need to be sustainably supported. 
[…] I am supportive because not only know-how will be developed in our country but also because innova-
tion and value creation will stay in Switzerland. […] I am supportive because, thanks to decentralised pro-
duction, structurally weak regions will profit. […] Since we agree on the goal, the only remaining question 
is which instrument will sustainably and promptly yield outcome […] [I support the feed-in tariff] because 




coordination concern actors’ joint efforts to convince the public or other relevant actors 
of their position. For example, prior to the votes in the parliament, the leader of the farm-
ers’ union held a press conference together with the heads of consumer and environmental 
associations to demonstrate their agreement in favour of an RE target and the feed-in tariff 
as instrument. Also, proponents of renewable energy technologies within the Free-Market 
party coordinated with RE associations and anti-nuclear associations to convince Centre 
and Free-Market parliamentarians to vote in favour of a RE target and the feed-in tariff and 
were successful especially amongst French-speaking representatives.
In summary, while the introduction of an RE generation target was relatively uncon-
tested, the policy instrument choice was the object of heated debate. At first, coalitions 
formed around three different instruments. When the first instrument was rejected, its 
advocates strategically joined the coalition around the instrument that complied better with 
their higher-level instrument preferences. The coalition around the feed-in tariff was finally 
victorious because it encompassed parliamentarians irrespective of their party membership 
since it complied best with most actors’ high-level general goals.
Fig. 6  Actor coalitions around a specific policy setting—the RE target value. The squares represent the 
design elements, and the connected circles represent the actors supporting the design elements. The vic-
torious coalition and its respective design element are displayed in green, and the losing coalition and its 
respective design element are displayed in yellow. (Color figure online)
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Low‑level abstraction: specific policy settings and specific instrument calibrations
The previous parliamentary decisions to adopt an RE target and a feed-in tariff required 
designing their specifics.20 The design elements concerned with the specific policy settings 
included the specific RE target value and the supported technologies. The first discussed 
element, the specific RE target value, was relatively uncontested, even though many differ-
ent values were proposed in the process. Yet most of them did not come close to a major-
ity. The projected 5400 GWh/a increase in electricity production from RE technologies by 
2030, compared to 2000, was supported by an entirely new and relatively large coalition 
when it was finally introduced (Fig. 6). Only a few actors (i.e. parts of the Far-Right Party, 
farmers, business associations and cantons) demanded a lower target, whereas voices ini-
tially calling for a higher target quickly settled on the final value.
The second specific policy setting, the technologies supported by the scheme, gave rise 
to much controversy around solar PV and realigned the coalitions; ultimately, two oppos-
ing, more or less equally strong, coalitions emerged (Fig.  7). Some actors, such as the 
labour unions and the small and large utilities, also left the discussion because of a lack 
of platform to express their opinions or disinterest in these technical and detailed design 
elements. One coalition—including the majorities of the Far-Right and Free-Market Par-
ties, parts of the Centre Party, parts of the business associations and the industry associa-
tion—argued for exclusion of solar PV which, at that time, was still the most expensive RE 
technology.21 The other coalition included the Left and Green Parties, parts of the Centre, 
Free-Market and Far-Right Parties, the RE, environmental and consumer associations, the 
farmers, the energy office, and the government. They put forward the argument that specifi-
cally solar PV, in which Switzerland already had a small, specialised industry, could cre-
ate jobs and compete with other countries.22 Additionally, the opponents of nuclear energy 
realised that their general goal of replacing nuclear power was not to be achieved if one of 
the RE technologies was excluded. Even though the pro-solar PV coalition outnumbered 
Fig. 7  Actor coalitions around a specific policy setting—inclusion of solar PV in supported technologies. 
The squares represent the design elements, and the connected circles represent the actors supporting the 
design elements. The victorious coalition and its respective design elements are displayed in green, while 
the losing coalition and its respective design elements are displayed in yellow. As yet undecided design 
elements and their coalitions are seen in grey. Actors who did not participate in the debate and decision-
making are displayed in purple. (Color figure online)
▸
20 The details of the specific policy settings and instrument calibrations at low-level abstraction were 
revised several times in the course of the policy design process (see “Design elements and sequence of 
design process” section and Fig. 11) and were one reason why the policy draft shuttled repeatedly between 
the two parliamentary chambers.44 It was, however, not the main reason why the two chambers took so 
long to agree on a final policy proposition. The main points of disagreement lay in the simultaneously 
debated measures to increase energy efficiency, as well as the draft on the electricity market liberalisation, 
which together formed one policy draft.
21 An important general instrument logic of all these actors was cost minimisation. A Centre parliamentar-
ian stated during the debate, “we should make sure that the money is used to generate optimum outcome. 
Optimum outcome is achieved when as much energy as possible is produced from renewable sources at the 
smallest possible cost. […] We have to make sure that solar PV does not take too much from the scarcely 
available resources”—Carlo Schmid-Sutter, AB 2006 S 879/BO 2006 E 879.
22 The representative of an RE association stated, “we made small flexible solar PV panels that […] we dis-
tributed amongst the parliamentarians saying that Switzerland had know-how in industrial solar PV and that 





the coalition favouring the exclusion of solar PV, a compromise to link the amount of sup-
port for solar PV to its price was decided upon. This was a concession by the feed-in tariff 
coalition to the supporters of a more cost-efficient instrument. The reason for this conces-
sion mainly lies in the pro-solar PV coalition’s fear that the entire scheme would be put in 
jeopardy again.23 24 This was a strategic decision by the solar PV proponents who antici-
pated that the falling prices of the technology would automatically increase the amount of 
support attributed to solar PV.25 The feed-in tariff coalition, thus, strategically agreed to 
a compromise to ensure the achievement of their high-level goals in the long run and to 
Fig. 8  Actor coalitions around a specific instrument calibration—cap of the consumer surcharge. The 
squares represent the design elements, and the connected circles represent the actors supporting the design 
elements. The victorious coalition and its respective design elements are displayed in green, and the losing 
coalition and its respective design elements are displayed in yellow. Actors who did not participate in the 
debate and decision-making are displayed in purple. (Color figure online)
23 The representative of an environmental association stated, “[we] offered a compromise proposal and 
brought it into the discussions but it did not advance at first. […] For us, the most important was not to get 
the entire feed-in tariff rejected again, or at least that it was not challenged” (Interviewee 18 in Table 2).
24 The president of the solar PV association and Free-Market parliamentarian stated, “we were afraid that 
our opponents would win the palm and that we would be left with nothing. But [with the compromise], we 
knew that we had the foot in the door. Even though it was little, we could work with it. So we were satis-
fied” (Interviewee 2 in Table 2).
25 A Left-party parliamentarian stated, “we told them, “You do not take any risk […]. We will not be 
able to build a lot of installations if the price is high […]”. We concluded the deal this way and the prices 
dropped by [a lot]. During the debate, the price of rooftop solar PV was at 1 CHF/kWh. Now, we are at 
0.1 CHF/kWh for a large installation” (Interviewee 3 in Table 2).
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avoid providing a trigger for restarting an entirely new design process in the short term. 
The final coalition supporting this compromise largely duplicated the coalition previously 
supporting an RE target (Fig. 4). The question of whether to include small hydropower and 
wind in the scheme was relatively quickly settled by entirely including the former and lim-
iting the latter to only suitable locations.
The debate around the specific instrument calibrations saw again a realignment of coalitions 
(Figs. 8 and 9. The consumer surcharge was a major point of debate because a higher surcharge 
implied more financing for RE technologies but conversely meant higher electricity prices for 
consumers. A coalition—including the Free-Market and parts of the Far-Right and Centre Par-
ties, the industry association and business associations, the energy office and the government—
favoured a low consumer surcharge in line with their higher-level aims and means to avoid addi-
tional taxes and fees and minimise cost (Fig. 8). They argued that electricity price increases 
would harm the economy and households and, hence, inhibit industrial competitiveness. Except 
for the government and the energy office, members of this coalition also supported the exemp-
tion of large electricity consumers from the surcharge, a suggestion brought forward by the 
industry association and associations specifically representing the energy-intensive pharma-
ceutical, biotech and metal industries (Fig. 8). These associations, and particularly the industry 
association, had worked hard to overturn the introduction of the feed-in tariff. However, when 
they realised their defeat in terms of instrument type, they presented this new proposition on the 
calibrations’ level to make the instrument more compliant with their high-level preferences.26 
The other coalition favouring a high consumer surcharge comprised the Left and Green Par-
ties, parts of the Centre and Free-Market Parties and the RE associations. It argued that RE sup-
port should be comprehensive to effectively incentivise enough RE deployment. For the same 
reason, this coalition opposed the exemption of large electricity consumers (Fig. 9). Finally, a 
compromise was found, and parliament opted for a relatively high consumer surcharge and a 
substantial exemption of the large electricity consumers. This represented a late victory for the 
industry association, which had unsuccessfully advocated for the least supportive option for RE 
in every design element but stayed involved throughout the entire policy process. It managed 
to coordinate effectively with business associations here to get parliamentarians from the Free-
Market Party on board, who had previously supported the feed-in tariff. Around the discussion 
of these specific instrument calibrations, the environmental associations had left the political 
arena.27
26 An interviewee from the Free-Market Party stated, “[this was] a proposition by the industry association 
because they felt that the battle was lost. […] The most important thing for them was not to have to pay the 
additional costs. In the beginning, they were certain to be able to overthrow the feed-in tariff. When they 
saw it advancing nonetheless, they came forward with this proposal. […] It was their last resort” (Inter-
viewee 2 in Table 2).
27 The representative of an environmental association stated, “[we] did not really participate in these dis-






In summary, at this lowest level of design elements, the coalitions were realigned. On 
the one hand, the coalitions from previous higher-level debates re-emerged around the 
solar PV compromise. On the other hand, new coalitions gathered around the questions of 
a specific RE target value as well as a cap of the consumer surcharge and the exemption of 
large electricity consumers. Even though these new coalitions were similar to the coalitions 
around instrument choice, they were not identical and thus had to accept compromises on 
the two issues. At this level, some actors also simply left the debate because of limited 
resources, disinterest or a lack of platform to express themselves.
Discussion
We offer a systematic application of Cashore and Howlett’s taxonomy of policy design ele-
ments to a real-world phenomenon (Cashore and Howlett 2007; Howlett 2014; Howlett 
and Cashore 2009) and an empirical analysis of the role of actors in nested policy design 
choices. Specifically, we studied how actors positioned themselves in relation to the indi-
vidual design elements and how they collectively shaped the policy output during the leg-
islative design phase of the Swiss RE-FiT, which was implemented in 2009 and introduced 
the first comprehensive support scheme for RE technologies.
Following the hierarchical structure of Cashore and Howlett’s taxonomy introduced 
in the  “Policy design” section and Fig.  1, the design process of the analysed policy 
moved from higher to lower levels of abstraction without revisiting more abstract design 
elements at later stages. High-level goals and instrument preferences, though not for-
mally decided upon, continuously influenced lower-level design choices. In other words 
and similarly to Hall’s (1993), the policy design process is path-dependent: The number 
of available expedient design elements at low level of abstraction is effectively reduced 
and confined by previous decisions taken on more abstract elements.
Our empirical analysis illustrates that the actors’ role in the design process has diverse 
facets and is continuously changing. Various actors take part in and influence decisions 
regarding policy design elements. In fact, they form coalitions around specific design ele-
ments where formal decisions must be taken. These coalitions are not stable throughout 
the entire policy design process because actors join and leave coalitions depending on the 
design element. We thus introduce the concept of design coalitions, which we define as sets 
of actors who gather around and advocate for specific policy design elements at any level of 
abstraction, be they high-level goals or specific instrument calibrations. Design coalitions 
are the relational structure thanks to which actors translate policy problems from agenda 
setting into actual policies during the design process. We find that design coalitions and 
the actors constituting them are dynamic and strategic. In the following, we introduce these 
two main attributes of design coalitions and subsequently contrast them with the existing 
actor frameworks introduced in “Policy design and actor conceptualisations” section.
First, our empirical findings indicate that design coalitions are not stable but dynamic. 
They disaggregate and form anew over the policy design process when moving from one 
Fig. 9  Actor coalitions around a specific instrument calibration—exemption of large electricity consumers 
from consumer surcharge. The squares represent the design elements, and the connected circles represent 
the actors supporting the design elements. The victorious coalition and its respective design elements are 
displayed in green, while the losing coalition and its respective design elements are displayed in yellow. As 
yet undecided design elements and their coalitions are displayed in grey. Actors who did not participate in 




design element to the next and down the different levels of abstraction (Fig.  10). In the 
present study, a large design coalition formed around the policy objective but split up into 
smaller coalitions around the policy instrument type. The individual actors constituting a 
design coalition have predefined, abstract policy goals they want to achieve. However, the 
perception of how these goals may be achieved can vary greatly between actors. In our 
empirical case, one goal all actors pursued was low and stable electricity prices. Neverthe-
less, opinions were highly divided as to whether RE technologies were a viable option for 
achieving these goals. Additionally, actors weigh the general goals differently—i.e. they have 
a different hierarchy of goals, as argued by Hall (1993), and thus may belong to different 
coalitions than actors with similar goals but different goal hierarchies (Schmidt et al. 2019). 
Our findings also suggest that design coalitions successful at higher levels of abstraction may 
not obtain what they initially intend when it comes to specific policy settings and instrument 
calibrations. When moving from one design element to the next, coalitions realign—meaning 
that different design coalitions aggregate around different elements. Hence, majorities may 
also change and lead to initially undesired policy outputs. In the empirical case study, one 
example is the support for solar PV. Large shares of the coalition backing the feed-in tariff as 
policy instrument type clearly had comprehensive solar PV deployment in mind. However, 
the final policy output largely limited the support for solar PV because of the opposing coali-
tion significantly gaining strength when the target technologies were debated at the specific 
measures level. Design coalitions are dynamic, not only because of actors changing coali-
tions, but also because of actors leaving and (re)entering the entire debate.
Second, design coalitions are strategic. Actors’ strategic thinking starts when the policy pro-
cess moves to the general instrument logic element and, further down, to the less abstract design 
elements. Actors may have preferences in terms of instrument choices, but they are ready to 
bend these preferences and accept instrument choices contradicting their preferred instrument 
logic if this is how they can best pursue their general goals on lower levels (if they previously 
lost on the higher level). Policymakers are able and willing to adopt policies (or design choices) 
that are inconsistent with distinct high-level goals and instrument preferences. Thus, they are 
Fig. 10  Stylised coalitions around different policy design elements. The winning and losing coalitions are 
illustrated in green and yellow, respectively. Actors not taking part in the decision are coloured in purple. 
Actors may support one coalition throughout the entire legislative process (Actor A); they may be split 
between coalitions (Actor B); they may change coalitions depending on the design element (Actor C); they 




more strategic—both in the short and the long term—than other frameworks suggest, such as 
the ACF (Sabatier 1988; Weible and Ingold 2018). Though how much this behaviour is directed 
by the incentive structure of the specific institutional context deserves further research. In the 
present study, for example, the Far-Right parliamentarians joined the coalition around a par-
ticular policy instrument, even though they opposed policy change and a RE target altogether 
in the first place, because they perceived that instrument as the lesser of two evils. Conversely, 
parliamentarians of the Free-Market Party, who would typically prefer the market to select 
winners, were willing to lower their sights in term of instrument preferences to implement an 
outcome-maximising policy to boost the domestic RE industry and thus cater to a high-level 
policy goal, namely industrial competitiveness. Therefore, actors start to think and act strategi-
cally early in the policy design process at very high levels of abstraction and do not necessarily 
act and join coalitions that correspond with their high-level goals and instrument preferences, 
nor do they entirely abstain from these goals and preferences. The strategic behaviour of actors 
is also reflected in the fact that they coordinate with actors whose interests may only margin-
ally overlap. These coordinating activities can even include new as well as previously opposing 
actors since design coalitions change depending on the design element that is being decided 
upon. Case studies analysing RE in other jurisdictions show that the interest-driven behaviour 
of actors is not unique to the Swiss case but that it can also be found in other political and insti-
tutional settings. For instance, the German feed-in tariff and, particularly, the generous support 
for solar PV was implemented by an unorthodox coalition of interest-driven actors including 
farmers, metalworker unions, the SME confederation and conservative Länder governments 
besides environmentalist and green groups (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). Similarly, in the USA, 
conservative Republicans support wind power in Texas despite their environmental scepticism 
because of its positive economic impact in rural districts (Jepson et al. 2012; Rygg 2012; Stokes 
2020). While actors have a preference for specific general aims and means, they will try to bend 
the design elements on lower levels to meet with their preferences as much as possible, in case 
they are incapable of pushing for their preferred design elements at a higher level. In the present 
empirical case study, an example is the industry association, which initially opposed any intro-
duction of new taxes and fees in favour of RE. However, when parliament opted for RE support, 
the industry association joined the debate again, this time to limit the extent of support to more 
expensive technologies and the consumer charge and to obtain an exemption for large electric-
ity consumers. Our analysis also suggests that those actors unsuccessful at the higher level are 
even more likely to stay in the process and thus invest resources at the lower level to push for 
design elements that are more aligned with their high-level goals and instrument preferences. 
Conversely, actors whose interests are satisfactorily met with higher-level design elements may 
drop out of the process at lower levels to save resources. However, unsuccessful actors being 
able to stay in the policymaking process and, more generally, design elements being individu-
ally decided upon, depends on the institutional rules of policymaking in a given jurisdiction.
Design coalitions are different from the policy designers previously conceptualised in the liter-
ature and presented in “Actors in policy designing” section in that they include more actors impli-
cated in deciding on a policy design than only governments and their advisory system. Obviously, 
the number and the breadth of actors depend on the specific institutional context of a policy design 
process. Yet, we argue that design coalitions will emerge—especially in new policy fields, but 
also in amendments of existing policy designs—where more actors than only the government are 
active. The actor conceptualisation presented here is also different from the established ones illus-
trated in “Actor conceptualisations in the policy process literature” section, including policy entre-
preneurs, epistemic communities, discourse coalitions, and instrument constituencies. Design coa-
litions are not limited to specific stages of the policymaking process and include the entire policy 
design output rather than focusing on specific design elements. For instance, policy entrepreneurs 
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and epistemic communities are problem-driven and, thus, disappear once their preferred policy 
issue has made it onto the agendas of policymakers, i.e. before the design process of a policy is 
finished. Instrument constituencies exclusively push for one specific instrument and, hence, omit 
all further design elements surrounding the instrument choice. Therefore, the actors in these three 
conceptualisations are exclusively interested in distinct high-level or mid-level abstraction design 
elements while design coalitions focus on all levels of abstraction including the very specific ones. 
Additionally, design coalitions include the entire set of actors engaged in the design process and 
do not focus on a specific subset of more important agents. Importantly, our actor conceptualisa-
tion does not challenge the other concepts but should be understood as complementary. Kingdon’s 
(1984) policy entrepreneurs, for instance, may push for their preferred policy solution as part of a 
design coalition which serves them to get their proposal through the policymaking process. The 
present case actually offers evidence for this in that specific members of the Left Party were inter-
ested in pushing for a RE-FiT very early on and seized the chance to build a coalition in favour 
of it when the window of opportunity opened up. Our concept of design coalitions also differs 
from advocacy coalitions as conceptualised by the ACF in terms of the reasons why actors side 
to form coalitions and in terms of how dynamic these coalitions are. As discussed in “Actor con-
ceptualisations in the policy process literature” section, the ACF’s underlying assumption is that 
political conflict and agency are completed once the policy instrument is chosen. Our new insights 
contrast with this notion, which does not consider strategic action and actors’ self-interest as build-
ing blocks for coalition formation, or as Ingold and Varone (2011, 322) write, ‘[f]urthermore, the 
ACF does not explicitly consider the (material) self-interests of policy actors and of policy brokers 
beyond their belief systems. Several authors applying the ACF have, in fact, found that interests 
could also be a strong driving factor for policy actors to join an advocacy coalition […], Sabatier 
[…] himself admits that, under certain circumstances, interests may play a crucial role’. While 
we do not argue against actors having beliefs on different levels, we find that they display stra-
tegic behaviour outside of situations of high conflict, and they build coalitions beyond the mere 
instrument choice on all levels of policy design. Additionally, the ACF conceives coalitions as 
stable over long time periods and, thus, focuses on macro-policy developments that lead to coali-
tion shifts (Knox-Hayes 2012; Sabatier 1988; Weible and Ingold 2018). In contrast, our design 
coalitions offer a conceptualisation of coalitions on the micro-level of policy design decisions. Our 
concept thus considers a different unit of analysis: While advocacy coalitions are considered driv-
ers of policy change and stability on a general level, design coalitions are useful in analysing what 
element of a policy changes and why.
While in the present study we have only focused on one jurisdiction and, more specifi-
cally, on one phase of the policymaking process, we believe that our findings are general-
isable beyond Switzerland and the legislative process, as also suggested by the examples 
from other countries given above where similar actor behaviour is found. The Swiss case is 
unusually well structured and transparent when it comes to which elements are integrated 
in the final policy design, but similar discussions take place in other institutional arrange-
ments; yet they are potentially not executed in an equally public manner.
Conclusion
In this paper, we inductively analysed the design process of the Swiss RE feed-in tariff and 
the role of actors therein on the basis of Cashore and Howlett’s (2007) taxonomy of nested 
policy design elements. Specifically, we studied how the political design actors positioned 
themselves during the policy design process in relation to individual design elements and 
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ultimately shaped the policy design output. We show how actor coalitions change throughout 
the process, depending on the design element under discussion. Following these results, we 
have derived the concept of design coalitions, which we defined as sets of actors who gather 
around and advocate for specific policy design elements. Design coalitions are the relational 
structure through which actors translate policy problems into a final policy design during the 
legislative process and are not stable, but of a dynamic and strategic nature.
Our study offers first insights into how design coalitions appear and change in the pub-
lic policy design process. By systematically considering policy design in our exploratory 
investigation, we show that actors behave more strategically than existing concepts and the-
orisations of the policy process argue. We contribute to the understanding of how political 
design actors shape the policy design output by proposing a new, mid-range concept that 
links actors and policy design.
Further research is needed, not only to empirically confirm and refine the introduced 
concept of design coalitions, but also to analyse the role of actors in cases of policy dis-
mantling (Burns, Tobin, and Sewerin 2018; Jordan, Bauer, and Green-Pedersen 2013) and 
policy layering (Howlett 2014), as well as in complex policy mixes (Schmidt and Sewerin 
2018). While we believe that the concept of design coalitions is generalisable beyond the 
analysed policy and country, future research is necessary to analyse how much the actors’ 
behaviour is directed by the incentive structure and the institutional setting of a policymak-
ing process. In addition, while we have found instances where members of design coali-
tions coordinated in the empirical analysis, we largely map the design coalitions in the 
empirical analysis along overlapping preferences. Further research into coordinating activi-
ties between members of design coalitions, for instance, on the basis of a network analysis 
could help strengthen and refine the here proposed concept. In line with the literature on 
path dependency and feedback policy (Béland 2010), further research could help estab-
lish the role of design coalitions’ strategic choices for kicking off and sustaining long-term 
policy feedback loops (Jordan and Matt 2014; Jordan and Moore 2020; Levin et al. 2012).
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Table 4  List of coded actors and the actors included therein
Coded actors Included actors
Green Party Grüne Partei Schweiz (GP), Parti écologiste suisse 
(les verts)
Left Party Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SP), Parti 
socialiste suisse (PS)
Centre Party Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz 
(CVP), Parti démocrate-chrétien suisse (PDC)
Free-Market Party Freisinnig-demokratische Partei der Schweiz (FDP), 
Parti radical-démocratique suisse (PRD)
Liberale Partei Schweiz (LPS), Parti libéral suisse 
(PLS)
Far-Right Party Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP), Union démocra-
tique du centre (UDC)
Government Bundesrat, Conseil fédéral
Energy office Bundesamt für Energie (BFE), Office fédéral de 
l’énergie (OFEN); subordinate agency of the Swiss 
Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, 
Energy and Communications
Cantons Konferenz kantonaler Energiedirektoren (EnDK), 
Conférence des dirécteurs cantonaux de l’énergie
Regierungskonferenz der Bergkantone, Conférence 
gouvernementale des cantons alpins
Individual cantons
Cities, municipalities Schweizerischer Städteverband, Union des villes 
suisses
Schweizerischer Gemeindeverband, Association des 
communes suisses
Cantonal and local municipal unions
Industry associations Economiesuisse
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Chemische Industrie 
(SGCI)
Interessensgemeinschaft der energieintensiven 
Branchen (IGEB)
Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband, Union 
patronale Suisse
Cantonal chambers of industry and commerce
Business associations Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband (SGV), Union 
suisse des arts et métiers (USAM)
Swissmem
Verband schweizerischer Elektroinstallationsfirmen 
(VSEI), Union suisse des installateurs-électriciens 
(USIE)
Cantonal and local business associations
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Table 4  (continued)
Coded actors Included actors
Large utilities, incumbent electricity producers (EP) Swisselectric
Energieforum Schweiz, forum suisse de l’énergie
Aktion für vernünftige Energiepolitik Schweiz 
(AVES)
Fédération Romande pour l’Energie (FRE)
Verband schweizerischer Elektrizitätsunternehmen 
(VSE), Association des entreprises électriques 
suisses (AES)
Schweizerische Vereinigung Atomenergie (SVA)
Individual nuclear and hydropower plants
Small utilities, distribution system operators 
(DSOs)
Swisspower
Verband schweizerischer Elektrizitätsunternehmen 
(VSE), Association des entreprises électriques 
suisses (AES)
Local DSOs




Cantonal and regional farmers’ unions
Individual farmers





Schweizerische Vereinigung für Sonnenergie, Société 
suisse pour l’énergie solaire (SSES)
Biomasse Schweiz, Biomasse Suisse
Holzenergie Schweiz, Energie-bois suisse
ADEV Energiegenossenschaft
Interessenverband Schweizer Kleinkraftwerkbesitzer 
(ISKB)
Solarenergie für Demokratie
Nordwestschweizer Aktionskomitee gegen Atom-
kraftwerke (NWA)
Environmental associations WWF
Schweizerische Greina-Stiftung, Fondation suisse de 
la Greina
Greenpeace
Stiftung Landschaftsschutz Schweiz, Fondation suisse 
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